

UNIFIED GLOBAL SOLUTIONS, LLC ROBOCALL MITIGATION PLAN

I. Background

The Federal Communications Commission (“FCC” or “Commission”) has adopted rules requiring voice service providers, like Unified Global Solutions, LLC (“UGS”), to, among other things, file certifications and robocall mitigation plans in the FCC’s Robocall Mitigation Database (“RMD”). 47 CFR § 64.6305; *see also Call Authentication Trust Anchor*, WC Docket No. 17-97, Sixth Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 23-18 (Mar. 17, 2023) (“*Sixth Caller ID Authentication Report and Order*”).

The FCC requires that all voice service providers certify in the Commission’s RMD whether they have implemented the STIR/SHAKEN authentication framework, and that all of the calls that it originates, carries or processes are subject to a robocall mitigation program consistent with the Commission’s rules.¹ The provider’s mitigation plan “shall include reasonable steps to avoid originating illegal robocall traffic and shall include a commitment to respond within 24 hours to all traceback requests from the Commission, law enforcement, and the industry traceback consortium, and to cooperate with such entities in investigating and stopping any illegal robocallers that use its service to originate calls.” 47 C.F.R. § 64.6305(a)(2).

Despite imposing a general duty to mitigate “robocalls,” the Commission’s codified rules do not define “robocall.”² The TRACED Act defines “robocall violation” as “a violation of subsection (b) or (e) of section 227 of the Communications Act of 1934.” TRACED Act § 11(d), Pub. L. No. 116-105, 133 Stat. 3274 (2019); *id.* at § 13(d)(f)(3) (defining a “suspected unlawful robocall” as a “call that the Commission or a voice service provider reasonably believes was made in violation of subsection (b) or (e) of section 227 of the Communications Act of 1934.” Thus, UGS’s training and

¹ See <https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-24-73A1.pdf> (WCB Jan. 25, 2024 Public Notice).

² The Commission’s TCPA-related regulations, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200, use the undefined term “illegal traffic,” 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200((k)-(m)), while its STIR/SHAKEN-related regulations define the FCC’s public-facing Robocall Mitigation Database, but not the “robocalls” that are to be mitigated. 47 C.F.R. § 64.6300. Thus, neither of the regulations that bear directly on the project of robocall mitigation expressly define “robocall.” *Cf. In re Advanced Methods to Target & Eliminate Unlawful Robocalls*, CG Docket No. 17-59, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 32 FCC Rcd. 9706, 9725 ¶ 56 (Nov. 17, 2017) (declining to define “illegal robocall,” and acknowledging that “the record shows confusion regarding how the proposed definition of ‘illegal robocall’ should apply to the call blocking rules.”); *In re Core Communications, Inc., et al. Tariff F.C.C. No. 3*, WC Docket No. 21-191, Order, 36 FCC Rcd. 9997, 9999 (June 23, 2021) (In a related context, stating that the “Commission defines a robocall as a call made using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice.”) (citing 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1); 47 CFR § 64.1200(a)). UGS therefore focuses on the two types of unlawful calls—227(b) and 227(e) of the TCPA—that Congress expressly addressed.

mitigation efforts focus, as they must, on potentially unlawful calls that violate either (a) 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (governing non-emergency calls initiated with a prerecorded or artificial voice or an automatic telephone dialing system, as that term has been interpreted by the Supreme Court in *Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid*, 592 U.S. 395 (2001)) or (b) 47 U.S.C. 227(e), or the Truth in Caller ID Act, which prohibits people from causing “any caller identification service to knowingly transmit misleading or inaccurate caller identification information with the intent to defraud, cause harm, or wrongfully obtain anything of value,” absent an applicable exemption.

The FCC’s rules contemplate that the provider’s plan should describe how it “complies with its obligation to know its customers pursuant to § 64.1200(n)(4), any procedures in place to know its upstream providers, and the analytics system(s) it uses to identify and block illegal traffic, including whether it uses any third-party analytics vendor(s) and the name(s) of such vendor(s).” 47 C.F.R. § 64.6305(d)(1)(ii). The Commission has acknowledged, however, that, “we do not currently require [] providers other than gateway providers to engage in ‘know-your-upstream-provider’ procedures, [but] if they have put such procedures in place, they must be documented in their robocall mitigation plan,” and that “we do not specifically require providers to use call analytics.” *Sixth Caller ID Authentication Report and Order* ¶ 40 & n.155-56.

The Commission has explained that a robocall-mitigation program is “sufficient if it includes detailed practices that can reasonably be expected to significantly reduce” the provider’s origination or carriage of illegal robocalls, and the voice service provider complies with the practices described in its plan. *Sixth Caller ID Authentication Report and Order* ¶ 31. UGS is dedicated to developing and taking reasonable steps. This document outlines UGS’s robocall mitigation plan.

II. UGS’s Know Your Customer (“KYC”) Standards

UGS is a voice service provider that focuses its business and operations on the small and medium-sized business segment of the voice services communications market in its local service territory. As part of its customer-onboarding process, UGS undertakes various commercially reasonable precautions to verify a given customer’s identity as part of entering into a service agreement.

UGS routinely deploys its equipment and services at the customer’s location and therefore is privy to their usage practices and personally meets and interacts with its end users as a matter of course. As of this filing, none of UGS’s business customers are call centers or other high-call-volume operations likely to generate illegal robocalls. UGS provisions all of its end users’ physical devices through which the voice services are used, and none are capable of being used as an autodialer, to deliver prerecorded or artificial voice messages, or spoofing their Caller IDs.

Among other data points collected and, as appropriate, verified, as part of its customer-onboarding processes, UGS gathers the following customer-identifying facts and circumstances:

- Customer business name,
- physical business location,
- current phone number(s),
- contact person(s),
- Email address,
- Federal EIN.

In addition to UGS's own KYC practices for enrolling new business customers, most new UGS customers choose to finance certain of their anticipated expenses through a financial institution that performs its own KYC and verification procedures on these prospective customers, including verifying, among other data points, the prospective customer's business address, phone number, legal entity name, and EIN. For businesses that are sole proprietorships or start-up businesses formed in the two years preceding their application for service and financing, the bank's approval is typically based on the owner's personal credit, in which cases the owner's social security number, date of birth, and home address are also obtained and checked.

UGS does not serve wholesale carrier customers. If it does, however, UGS acknowledges that its verification practices would be expanded to include confirming a carrier customer's reported status in the FCC's Form 499 Filer database of registered carriers, and the Commission's Robocall Mitigation Database, along with a completed USF exemption certificate.

III. UGS's Acceptable Use Policy

UGS's end users must comply with its Acceptable Use Policy (AUP). Among other things, this AUP prohibits:

- Using the Services to engage in any activities that are illegal, abusive, false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading, or any activity that exploits, harms, or threatens to harm children.
- Engaging in any unsolicited advertising, marketing, or other unlawful activities using the Services, including, without limitation, any activities that violate laws applicable to advertising, electronic communications, and telemarketing, including, but not limited to, Section 5 of the FTC Act (15 U.S.C. § 45), the CAN-SPAM Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7713), the Telemarketing Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6108), the Federal Trade Commission Telemarketing Sales Rule (16 C.F.R. § 310 et seq.), the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (47 U.S.C. §§ 227), the Federal Communications Commission regulations (47 C.F.R. 64.1200 et seq.) and orders implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, and all federal and state Do Not Call and calling-time restriction laws and regulations.
- Creating a false identity, forged email address or header, phone number, or otherwise attempting to mislead others as to the identity of the sender or the origin of a message or phone call, including failing to comply with the Truth in

Caller ID Act.

UGS reserves the right to suspend and/or terminate all Services in the event of an AUP violation.

IV. Telephone Number Authorization and STIR-SHAKEN Capabilities

UGS has fully implemented the STIR/SKAKEN authentication framework across its entire network, via its third-party hosted STIR/SKAKEN authentication and verification service provider, TransNexus' ClearIP platform. All calls for which it serves as the originating carrier are compliant with 47 C.F.R. Sec. 64.6301(a)(1)-(2).

UGS's end users only use telephone numbers to which they have subscribed from (or ported into) UGS, such that UGS has a documented, verified relationship between the originating end user and their telephone number(s) used to originate their calls. Thus, it should be technically impossible for UGS's end users to manipulate their caller ID and thus violate the Truth in Caller ID Act. Should that change and customers could use as a caller ID any number not assigned by UGS, or ported into UGS's network by the end user, UGS will document the end user's right to use the associated phone number(s) from the unaffiliated provider.

V. Proactive Network Monitoring

UGS has various monitoring and reporting systems in place via its upstream carrier to analyze traffic on its network for potentially suspicious traffic patterns that are likely to be associated with illegal robocalls or other potentially unlawful usage. For example, UGS's SIP trunking provider and monitoring systems can assess traffic based on various criteria, including data relating to call frequency per line, short-duration calls, answer-seizure ratios, and other anomalous call patterns. UGS's ClearIP service from TransNexus includes fraud- and robocall-mitigation analytics tools.

If those systems and/or UGS detects a pattern consistent with illegal robocalls, or it has reason to suspect illegal robocalling or spoofing is occurring on its network, UGS will take prompt action to identify the party that is using its network to carry these calls and take appropriate action. Once suspected unlawful traffic is discovered, UGS will block any further traffic from being carried associated with the Media IP address of that suspicious traffic. In the event UGS discovers any suspicious traffic that is not demonstrably unlawful, UGS will complete its investigation, and their service can be temporally suspended while that process is completed depending on the severity of the complaint.

VI. Commitment to Timely Traceback Responses and Cooperation

UGS commits to respond fully and in a timely manner, within 24 hours, to all traceback requests from the Commission, law enforcement, and the industry traceback consortium, and to cooperate with such entities in investigating and stopping any illegal robocallers that use its

service to originate, carry, or process illegal robocalls. UGS will dedicate sufficient resources to provide timely and complete responses to such requests, and will investigate suspicious activity found by its monitoring systems or reported to it by appropriate parties and take appropriate action.